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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FORMEN CORPORATION, et al.,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 870510-CA

vs.
MEL PARKS, et al. ,
DefendantsRespondents .

PETITION FOR REHEARING

PETITION
Pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, defendants-respondents hereby petition this Court for a
rehearing of this case, or in the alternative for the correction
of a clerical error.
The ground for this petition is that the Court's opinion
indicates that the only plaintiff is Formen Corporation, and
awards attorney fees and double costs in favor of respondents
and against Formen, whereas the appeal was prosecuted by two
individual parties in addition to Formen.
9

The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this petition
is presented in good faith and not for delay.
A copy of the Court's opinion is attached as Appendix "A".

ARGUMENT
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS
SHOULD BE IMPOSED AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS
AS WELL AS THE CORPORATE PLAINTIFF.
The initial complaint in this case was filed by Formen
Corporation only. (R. 1-17•)
initial

complaint

reference.)

An

appears
amended

(A copy of the first page of the
in Appendix

complaint

"B" for

was

the

subsequently

Court's
filed,

listing as plaintiffs Formen Corporation, J. Fred Smith, and Don
R. Skipworth.
amended

(R. 912-53.)

complaint

reference.)

The

appears

(A copy of the first page of the
in Appendix

individual

"C" for

plaintiffs

shareholders of Formen. (Tr. 51, 244.)

were

the

Court's

directors

and

The case proceeded to

trial on the amended complaint.
The
heading

Court's

opinion

in

this

matter

uses

the

pleading

from the initial complaint rather than that of the

amended complaint.

More critically, the Court's opinion states

as follows:
The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed and the case is remanded for a
determination of Parks' attorney fees on
appeal which are ordered to be paid by
Formen.
Double costs are ordered against
Formen pursuant to Rule 33(a).
Formen Corp. v. Parks, No. 870510-CA

(Utah Ct. App. Oct. 13,

1988)(emphasis added).
Respondents respectfully submit that the attorney fees and
double

costs

should

have been

awarded

plaintiffs, jointly and severally.

against

each

of the

Respondents assume that the

reference to Formen only in the opinion is a clerical error, and
2

request that the opinion be corrected to reflect that each of
the plaintiffs is liable for the attorney fees and double costs.

CONCLUSION
The petition

for rehearing

should

be granted,

and the

opinion corrected to reflect that any judgment on remand for
attorney fees and double costs may be entered against Formen
Corporation,

Don

Skipworth,

and J.

Fred

Smith,

jointly

and

severally.
DATED this 27th day of October, 1988.

JACKSON HOWARD and
£f
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Respondents

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
27th day of October, 1988.
Lowell V. Summerhays
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
4609 South State Street
P.O. Box 1355
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355
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APPENDIX "A"
Formen Corp. v. Parks,
No. 870510-CA (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1988).

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooooo

OCT 141988

Formen Corporation/
a Utah corporation.
Plaintiff and Appellant,

HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN
OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Mel Parks/ Parks Enterprises, Inc.,
a Idaho corporation/ Nasky Joint
Venture, a partnership, Del Taylor,
Nancy Taylor, his wife# Larry
Anderson/ Hal Parks, Jerry Parks,
Starla Parks, aka Starla Peterson,
Don Charlesworth, Bryce Averill,
Harry Keith Huffaker, Elza
Huffaker, his wife, Thomas Gene
Reid, Mary Reid, his wife,
Wanda Hopper, and John Does I
through X,

Case No. 870510-CA

FILED
;j4 31G33
Meryl Kocrun
Ctcr1.' d t'.-i3 Court
UU-.S. C c u * of Appeals

Defendants and Respondents.
Before Judges Garff, Davidson and Billings.

DAVIDSON, Judge:
Formen Corporation (Formen) is a Utah corporation whose
stockholders and officers, during the time at issue# included
J. Fred Smith (Smith) and Donald R. Skipworth (Skipworth)•
Parks Enterprises, Inc. (Parks) is an Idaho corporation whose
stockholders and officers were members of the Melvin R. Parks
(Mel Parks) family.
On May 1, 1978, Formen and Parks executed a joint venture
agreement for the purpose of developing and selling a
recreational tract of land in Sanpete County, Utah, to be known
as Elk Ridge Ranches (Elk Ridge). The agreement required Parks
to ezpend $180,000.00 to acquire the land to be developed.
Formen was required to accept full liability and responsibility
for the development of Elk Ridge including obtaining
governmental approvals, constructing roads, promoting the
venture, and sales. The parties acknowledged that water was

essential to the agreement so Formen agreed to purchase the
water and provide water rights to the parcels as they were
sold. In the event Formen defaulted under the terms of the
agreement or the agreement terminated short of its time, Parks
had the right to assume Formen's position in the water purchase
contract. The agreement also provided for the return of title
to Parks of all unsold property when the joint venture
terminated. At that time, Parks had the right to acquire the
water rights pertaining to the parcels at a price equal to
Formen's cost. The agreement was signed by Smith as president
of Formen and M. Hal Parks, Mel Parks' son, as president of
Parks.
Later, the parties discussed another development in the
same area and agreed that Formen and Parks would employ funds
from Elk Ridge to purchase the property. The parties proceeded
with this new venture on the basis that the expenses and
profits would be shared equally by the parties. This
development was known as Hideaway Valley.
As a result of a disagreement in the spring of 1981, a
memorandum of partnership dissolution agreement was executed.
The dissolution agreement cited the joint venture agreement
concerning Elk Ridge and referred to Hideaway Valley as another
joint venture which Formen desired to establish. The parties
mutually agreed that the joint ventures would be terminated as
of December 31, 1980. Additionally, the assets and liabilities
would be divided equally. The agreement contained a confusing
provision for attorney fees if a party sought enforcement with
an attorney or brought suit for enforcement. After the
dissolution agreement was executed, Formen continued alone with
the development of Hideaway Valley. Parks withdrew from that
development with the exception of building a family complex on
land situated in Hideaway Valley.
A Hideaway Valley Property Owners Association (HVPOA) was
formed with three officers of Formen initially serving as
trustees. During early summer 1982, the purchasers of property
in Hideaway Valley received $65,00 assessments from the HVPOA
which were mailed in Formen envelopes. On or about August 15,
1982, several Hideaway Valley property owners met at the Parks
complex to discuss the assessment. Also in attendance was
Skipworth, a HVPOA trustee, who informed those present that the
trustees alone would decide how the money was to be spent.
Skipworth testified at trial that the trustees contemplated
using the assessment for road maintenance and snow removal.
During October 1982, another meeting took place in which five
individuals were elected trustees including Smith and Mel Parks.

The new trustees specifically discussed purchasing equipment
for snow removal operations, but could not agree on what course
of action to take* At a trustee's meeting of January 10, 1983,
Mel Parks' position as a trustee was terminated by other
trustees. Subsequently, one trustee and a member of the HVPOA
wrote to Hideaway Valley property owners to inform them Mel
Parks had been "released" from his position as a trustee and
that a meeting of the HVPOA would be held in Provo on January
27, 1983, to discuss the problems facing the association and to
elect new trustees. On or about January 18, 1983, Formen
retained a business consultant to investigate and "evaluate the
situation" in Hideaway Valley and inform them as to the "whole
scenario." The consultant spoke with several property owners
concerning his fictitious interest in purchasing two lots in
Hideaway Valley. He was told of problems including how the
HVPOA was utilizing assessment funds, availability of water,
and property foreclosures. One owner stated there was a "gross
overcharge" for snow removal. The owners told the consultant
that zoning problems made it difficult to obtain a building
permit, and that they were anticipating being sued by Formen.
Another owner stated, "[Y]ou can't believe anything that they
say." The consultant testified this referred to Smith. Two
owners informed the consultant, "You don't want to buy a lot
until you find out exactly what you're getting into."
The very next day, January 19, 1983, Formen filed the
complaint in this action. Formen sought and was granted a
temporary restraining order which enjoined defendants from
making any verbal or written statements which were defamatory
or making contacts with others which would be detrimental to
Formen. Subsequent to an order to show cause hearing, the
trial court denied a motion for permanent injunction.
An amended complaint was filed on July 7, 1983, adding
Smith and Skipworth as plaintiffs and deleting Don Charlesworth
as a defendant. This complaint alleged: (1) tortious
interference against all defendants; (2) slander of Formen
against all defendants; (3) slander of Skipworth against all
defendants; (4) slander of Smith against all defendants; (5)
negligence against Mel Parks; (6) antitrust violations against
all defendants; (7) injunctive relief against all defendants;
(8) foreclosure against Thomas Gene Reid and Mary Reid, his
wife; (9) foreclosure against Bryce Averill and Mary Averill,
his wife; and (10) foreclosure against Harry Keith Huffaker and
Elza Huffaker, his wife.

On October 28, 1983/ the defendants, with the exception
of Larry Anderson, answered the amended complaint. In
addition, those defendants counterclaimed for: (1) costs and
attorney fees in defending the action; (2) general and
compensatory damages resulting from the injury to defendants'
reputation; (3) punitive damages; (4) costs for the
counterclaim; (5) reformation of the partnership dissolution
agreement to provide Parks with the water rights necessary for
the properties they received under the dissolution agreement;
(6) rescission of the contracts between Formen and the
foreclosure defendants; and (7) refund of all monies paid by
the foreclosure defendants to Formen.
Both sides moved for summary judgment. By an order dated
March 27/ 1984, the trial court granted partial summary
judgment to defendants, dismissed certain defendants/ and
dismissed plaintiffs' cause of action for injunctive relief.
A bench trial on the remaining causes of action was held
on August 27-31# 1984. At the close of plaintiffs' case,
defendants moved for dismissal. The parties stipulated to a
dismissal of plaintiffs' cause of action against Mel Parks for
negligence. The trial court subsequently granted defendants'
motion to dismiss as to the other causes of action and
dismissed defendants' counterclaim for malicious prosecution.
By an order dated October 30, 1984, the trial court stated
Parks was entitled to a decree of reformation which ordered
Formen to provide Parks water# without cost/ for those lots
conveyed to Parks under the dissolution agreement. The court
also found plaintiffs' case to be without merit and lacking in
good faith. Therefore, attorney fees and costs were awarded to
defendants pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987).
Plaintiffs appeal from: (1) evidentiary rulings of the
trial court plaintiff claims were biased and prejudiced; (2)
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining causes of
action pursuant to Utah R. Civ, P. 41(b); (3) reformation of
the partnership dissolution agreement to provide Parks water;
(4) granting of summary judgment to the foreclosure defendants;
and (5) the award of attorney fees against plaintiffs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court/ in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199/ 202-03
(Utah App. 1987)/ cited Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) and quoted Acton
v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996/ 999 (Utah 1987) as it related to
findings of fact. Rule 52(a) states findings of fact "shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the

credibility of the witnesses." In Utah/ the "clearly erroneous"
standard requires "that if the findings . . . are against the
clear weight of the evidence/ or if the appellate court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made/ the findings • . . will be set aside." State v. Wright,
744 P.2d 315/ 317 (Utah App. 1987)(quoting State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191/ 193 (Utah 1987)). "To mount a successful attack on the
trial court's findings of fact/ an appellant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to
the court below# the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068# 1070 (Utah
1985). Therefore/ this court must accept the trial court's
findings unless we believe they are clearly erroneous/ they do
not comport with Acton, or a party challenging the findings
establishes there is insufficient evidence to support them.
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
Formenfs brief presents several examples of evidentiary
rulings supposedly reflecting bias and prejudice on the part of
the trial court. Included is a specific instance in which
testimony was not allowed. Also/ Formen asserts there were
numerous occasions when Parks* objections were sustained while
its own were overruled. Utah R. Evid. 403 states, "Although
relevant/ evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury# or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." An appellate court "will
not interfere with the trial court's ruling on evidentiary
matters unless it clearly appears that the court so abused its
discretion that there is a likelihood, that injustice resulted."
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985). Any exhibition
of bias or prejudice against or in favor of a party in
evidentiary rulings by the trial court certainly would be a gross
abuse of discretion. However, our reading of the transcript
reveals no such bias or prejudice. This is an emotional case
which contains testimony reflecting the parties' differing views
of what transpired. It is natural that parties would be
sensitive to any adverse evidentiary rulings. However/ no error
is shown. The trial court appeared to make every effort to
eliminite the irrelevant and to limit needlessly repetitive
evidence.
DISMISSAL OF FORMEN'S REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION
Formen claims the trial court erred in granting defendants'
motion to dismiss its remaining causes of action. Utah R. Civ.
P. 41(b) states in pertiner.t part:

After the plaintiff, in an action tried by
the court without a jury, has completed
the presentation of his evidence the
defendant, without waiving his right to
offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on
the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. The court as trier of the facts
may then determine them and render
judgment against the plaintiff or may
decline to render any judgment until the
close of all the evidence. If the court
renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings
as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided
for in this rule, other than a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue or for lack of an indispensable
party, operates as an adjudication upon
the merits.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping
Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985), discussed this rule:
The purpose of the rule is to permit the
judge, as the fact finder, "to weigh the
evidence, to draw inferences therefrom
and, if it finds the evidence insufficient
to make out a case for the plaintiff, to
render a decision for the defendant on the
merits. . . ." Rule 41(b) further
provides that if the trial court grants a
motion to dismiss at the close of the
plaintiff's case, it must enter findings
of fact "as provided in Rule 52(a)." It
has often been stated that when reviewing
factual findings of a court sitting
without a jury, this Court defers to the
trial court and will not overturn its
findings if they are adequately supported
by the evidence. . . . No such deference
is given to conclusions of law that are
reviewed for correctness.
Id. at 252-53 (citations omitted).

In this case, there are twenty-nine findings upon which the
nine conclusions of law are based. The findings appear to
carefully cover the causes of action dismissed by the court.
a. Tortious Interference
Leiah Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah
1982), discusses the elements of the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic relations. The court
wrote:
[I]n order to recover damages, the
plaintiff must prove (1) that the
defendant intentionally interfered with
the plaintiffs existing or potential
economic relations, (2) for an improper
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing
injury to the plaintiff. Privilege is an
affirmative defense . . . which does not
become an issue unless "the acts charged
would be tortious on the part of an
unprivileged defendant.Id. at 304 (citations omitted). The evidence fails to show the
elements described above. Rather, it shows parties concerned
with a troubling situation and pursuing their own business
activities. The findings are supported by the evidence and
will not be disturbed.
b. Defamation
The basic elements of defamation are listed in Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 558 (1977) as:
(a)

a false and defamatory statement
concerning another;

(b)

an unprivileged publication to a
third party;

(c)

fault amounting at least to
negligence on the part of the
publisher; and

(d)

either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by
the publication.

Examination of the findings relative to this issue
indicates the trial court found no credible or believable
evidence that any defendant made a defamatory statement/ that
any of the statements they did make were false, or that
plaintiff or an officer thereof suffered any damages because of
an action of defendants. A review of the trial record supports
the findings.
c.

Antitrust Violations

Formen1s brief claims defendants have violated the Utah
Antitrust Act "by restraining trade" and cites Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-914 (1988). Because that section is a criminal
statute, Formen seeks a remedy under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-919(1) (1988). Section 76-10-914 states:
(1)

Every contract/ combination in the
form of trust or otherwise/ or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce is declared to be illegal.

(2)

It shall be unlawful for any person
to monopolize/ or attempt to
monopolize/ or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons to
monopolize/ any part of trade or
commerce.

The findings specifically negate any conspiracy between or
among defendants. No believable or credible evidence exists
which shows defendants violated any antitrust laws. While the
finding relative to' antitrust laws is more of a conclusion of
law, Formen has failed to present even minimally sufficient
evidence to support the claim.
AGREEMENT REFORMATION
Formen claims the trial court erred in reforming the
memorandum of partnership dissolution agreement to provide
water for the lots conveyed to defendants without cost. Case
law on this issue is presented in Hottinoer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d
1271 (Utah 1984)/ as:
Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in
equity and is appropriate where the terms
of the written instrument are mistaken in
that they do not show the true intent of
the agreement between the parties. There

are two grounds for reformation of such an
agreement: mutual mistake of the parties
and ignorance or mistake by one party,
coupled with fraud by the other party.
Id. at 1273 (footnotes omitted). However, reformation "is not
available to rewrite a contract to include terms never
contemplated by the parties." Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690
P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984).
Findings of fact 14 through 19 discuss the intent of the
parties concerning the land and the water and find that there
was mutual mistake in not discussing the intent in the
dissolution agreement. The trial court was correct. A reading
of the joint venture agreement clearly shows Parks was required
to purchase the property and Formen was responsible to acquire
the water "essential to the intent" of the agreement.
Additionally, Formen agreed to provide water rights to land
parcels as they were sold. If, for some reason, Formen
defaulted or the venture was not completed, then Parks had the
right to assume Formen*s position in the purchase contract for
the water.
The joint venture agreement's section concerning
termination required all unsold parcels to be distributed to
Parks who then had a right to purchase the water rights
pertaining thereto. However, the dissolution agreement
requires the parties to divide the assets and liabilities of
the joint venture agreement. In so doing, it provided that
Formen would receive an equal amount of the property. Formen
already had the water rights pertaining to the property it
received under the dissolution agreement. To divide everything
else, but then to require Parks to purchase water rights from
Formen for the Parks parcels flies in the face of common sense.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS HUFFAKER
Formen claims the trial court erred in entering summary
judgment in favor of Harry and Elza Huffaker for recovery of
funds paid to Formen for purchase of a land parcel. Formen
argues that there were genuine issues of material fact, that
Huffaker's claim was barred by the appropriate statute of
limitation, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
When Formen1s claims concerning issues of fact are compared
to the evidence available to the trial court, we believe that
the court below acted correctly. The argument on appeal
concerning the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to g ant
summary judgment is not developed in the brief sufficiently to

follow. It appears to us that Formen is questioning whether
this state's Sixth Judicial District Court is a "state court."
We will not entertain this question. Nothing was raised below
to show this claimed issue. Any argument not presented to the
trial court will not be heard for the first time on appeal.
Bancrerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983).
ATTORNEY FEES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987) allows the trial court to
award attorney fees "if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith."1 The case of Cadv v. Johnson, 671
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), states "without merit" means the
case is "of little weight or importance having no basis in law
or fact." To establish a lack of "good faith," the party
requesting attorney fees must show that one or more of the
following factors is missing:
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of
the activities in question; (2) no intent
to take unconscionable advantage of
others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge
of the fact that the activities in
question will, [sic] hinder, delay or
defraud others.
Id. (quoting Tacoma Assoc, of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d
453, 458, 433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967)). The findings of fact
carefully cover the issue. We agree that Formen1s case falls
within the definition of without merit especially since it has
all the appearances of being a manufactured preemptive legal
strike. The lower court also found the case to lack good
faith. We agree. As the findings state, the case was brought
to "hinder and delay defendants," "to prevent the defendants
from enjoying the use of their property," and to harass and
frighten them. The evidence fully supports the findings and
conclusion.
1. The attorney fee provision in the dissolution agreement
would ordinarily dictate the award of fees. In this case,
however, the provision is inapplicable since it would award
attorney fees to the party first filing an action without regard
to fault or liability.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Parks requests attorney fees on appeal. This issue is guided
by R. Utah Ct. App. 33(a) which states, "If the court determines
that a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages and single or
double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party." This court's opinion in O'Brien v. Rush, 744
P.2d 306 (Utah App.'1987), clarifies the rule. A frivolous appeal
is one "having no reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in
Rule [Utah Ct. App.] 40(a)" and an "appeal brought for delay is
one marked by dilatory conduct or conduct designed to mislead the
court and which benefits only the appellant." Icl. at 310.
We find no reasonable legal or factual basis for the appeal.
As an example showing a lack of legal or factual basis, Formen*s
appellate brief contains the argument that the trial court erred
in dismissing its cause of action for negligence against Mel
Parks. However, the trial transcript reveals Formen stipulated to
dismissal of the cause at trial. Such a course of conduct falls
within the definition of frivolous.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the case is
remanded for a determination of Parks1 attorney fees on appeal
which are ordered to be paid by Formen. Double costs are ordered
against Formen pursuant to Rule 33(a).
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything significant to
existing law and hence is not to be published in the Utah or
Pacific Reporters.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:
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APPENDIX "B"
First page of Verified Complaint

Lowell V. Summerhays, Esq.
Edward T. Wells, Esq.
SUMMERHAYS, RUNYAN & MCLELLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-5200
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FORMEN CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs

VERIFIED
COMPLAINT
Civil No.

MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISE,
INC., an Idaho corporation,
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a
partnership, DEL TAYLOR,
NANCY TAYLOR, his wife,
LARRY ANDERSON, HAL PARKS,
JERRY PARKS, STARLA PETERSEN
a/k/a STARLA PARKS, DON •
CHARLESWORTH, BRYCE AVERILL,
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA
HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS
GENE REID, MARY REID, his
wife, WANDA HOPPER and
JOHN DOES I through X,

f.T7?

Defendants.

The Plaintiff Formen Corporation by and through counsel
Lowell V. Summerhays and Edward T. Wells of the firm of Summerhays,
Runyan & McLella: d hereby complains of the Defendants and alleges
follows:

APPENDIX "C
First page of Amended Verified Complaint

Lowell V. Summerhays
Edward T. Wells
SUMMERHAYS, RUNYAN & McLELLAND
420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-5200
Defendants for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH, and
FRED SMITH,
Plaintiffs,
AMENDED VERIFIED
COMPLAINT

v.
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation, NASKY JOINT
VENTURE, a partnership, DEL TAYLOR,
NANCY TAYLOR, his wife, LARRY ANDERSON
HAL PARKS, JERRY PARKS, STARLA PETERSON aka STARLA PARKS, BRYCE AVERILL,
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA HUFFAKER,
his wife, THOMAS GENE REID, MARY
REID, his wife, WANDA HOPPER, PARKS
& SONS SANITATION, INC., a Utah
corporation, PARKS & SONS INTERMOUNTAIN INC., an Idaho corporation,
and JOHN DOES I through X,

C i-inl Nn
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Defendants.

The plaintiffs Formen Corporation, Don Skipworth, and
Fred Smith, by and through counsel Lowell V. Summerhays and
Edward T. Wells of the firm of SUMMERHAYS, RUNYAN & McLELLAND,
hereby complain of the defendants and allege as follows:

